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Abstract
After the stabilization plan of 1994, and trade liberalization, the Brazilian inflation rate
dropped from two figures monthly to a single one annually. Several large capitalization firms
began adhering to the Annual Social Audit disclosures, a series of internal and external
indicators mostly related to employees’ well-being and community. In this paper, we tested
the Efficiency Wage Model, shirking version, as per Manchin Manning (1992) and applied
by Kitazawa Ohta (2002). We observed 84 firms who were members of the Annual Social
Audit network from 1997 to 2005. We find that (i) our studied firms are not paying salaries
above market level, as indicated by the efficiency wage model, and (ii) the results suggest the
use of the bargain model of repetitive negotiation between employers and employees.
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During the first half of the 1990s, Brazil experienced dramatic changes at the macro and 
micro levels.  Inflation rate dropped from two digits annually—often monthly—to a single digit. 
Trade liberalization increased Brazilian exports and imports, causing substantial changes in level 
of industry competitiveness; privatization of key sectors also increased industry productivity 
(Arbach et al, 2004). Wages, previously legally indexed to inflation, became freely negotiable. 
Additionally, around this time, several firms joined the Annual Social Audit disclosure network. 
This involved a set of internal and external indicators, ranging from financials indicators to 
environmental and labor programs. Within this new competitive environment, would firms set 
wages above market level to increase productivity? This paper’s objective is to test this 
hypothesis by observing 84 large capitalization firms during a nine-year window from 1997 to 
2005. This period came right after several economic reforms were successfully implemented.  
All firms in our study freely adopted the Annual Social Audit. 
The next section briefly reviews some efficiency wage models. It also describes the data 
and the regression model used. Section III shows the major results with respective comments, 
including study limitations.   Finally, section IV provides concluding remarks regarding the fact 
that results fail to support the efficiency wage model. 
 
2. Model and Data 
Efficiency wage models state that wages above the market equilibrium results in higher 
work effort, increased productivity and, consequently, higher profits. The benefits of paying 
higher wages come about in different ways, depending on the model type. For instance, higher 
wages may proportionate better diets, decrease the costs associate with firing/hiring workers 
(turnover) and decrease costs of monitoring the work effort. This last one, or the  shirking 
version, is the one provided by Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984). It is sometimes also referred to as the 
classical version.  
A modified version, with dynamic panel data, was developed by Machin & Manning 
(1992). This version has been applied in different countries; for instance, Kitazawa & Ohta 
(2002) applied it for the Japanese industry. To the extent of our knowledge, an identical model 
has not previously been applied to Brazil. Arbache et al (2004) and Esteves (2006) specifically 
addressed the Brazilian case; both studies, rich on data, adopted alternative models. Our study 
differs in applying a dynamic panel data approach to test the shirking version of the model; it 
also is restricted to those firms who adhere to the Annual Social Audit system of disclosures. 
The data was collected from 84 large capitalization firms that made public their Annual 
Social Audit statements ( www.balancosocial.org.br). Annual Social Audit statements are 
published yearly and contain information on a firm’s “social commitments” to its employees and 
community. The information ranges from financial statements to environmental issues. 
Specifically, the company discloses data on employee composition indicators—for instance, percentage of females and blacks in management positions—and data on “the exercise of 
corporate citizenship”—for instance, employees’ profit-sharing programs.  
 
The following variables were collected from the Annual Social Audit statements: net 
revenues (gross earnings less taxes, interest expenses, deductions and income taxes); operating 
results (lies between gross revenues and profits before income tax); gross payroll (total sum of 
wages, gratifications, commissions and bonuses, 13
th wage, holiday pay and compulsory social 
benefit payments, i.e., INSS, FGTS and social contribution); and number of employees. Total 
tangible fixed assets were collected either from the Reuters database™ or directly from the 
firms’ website balance sheets.   
 
The period available ranged from 1997 to 2005, i.e., nine years. Existing literature has 
documented the problems associated with running micro-panel data (Baltagi, 2005); the number 
of years are limited, and such limitations might affect the asymptotic arguments and the 
Hausman test itself. Cobb-Douglas production functions are particularly sensitive to a small 
number of periods. Only taking into account the first differences, to eliminate unobserved firm-
specific effects, result in weak instruments (Blundell & Bond, 1998). The Cobb-Douglas 
estimate model is based on the Machin and Manning (1992) approach as follows: 
 
yit = αkit + βlit + γeit + εit, (1) 
where Y is the log of net revenues (a proxy for output), k is the log of capital stock, l is the log of 
employment, e is the effort level, and ε is a combination of time-specific effect, firm-specific 
effect, and the disturbance: i and t stands for firm i at the date t.     
The effort model is defined as: 
eit = ψ1Et(ei,t+1) + ψ2ωit + ψ3 Et(ωi,t+1) + ηi + µt + Et (µt+1) (2) 
where ω is wage and ū is utility level; again, e is effort and i and t stands for firm i at the date t. 
Equation (3) is the result after rearranging both equations (Kitazawa & Ohta, 2002): 
yit = βy1yi,t+1 + βl0lit + βl1li,t+1 + βk0kit + βk1k i,t+1 + βw0ω1t + βw1ω i,t+1 + fi + gi + ε it  (3) 
with βl1 = - βy1 βl0 and βk1 = - βy1 βk0  
where fi is the firm-specific effect,  gi is the time-specific effect, and ε it  is the disturbance. 
 
3. Estimation Results 
 
Equation (3) is our estimated equation. The GMM estimation, to correct the bias, is based on 
Arellano & Bond (1991). Table I below shows the results: Table I: Estimation Results for firms who disclosure their Annual Social Audits 
Variable  Coefficient(Estimated)  t-statistic (Probability) 
yit+1  βy1 (0.110)  5.630 (0.000)*** 
kit  βk0 (0.097)  4.265 (0.000)*** 
k it+1  βk1 (-1.020)  -134.39 (0.000)*** 
lit  βl0 (0.005)  2.643 (0.009)*** 
l it+1  βl1 (0.002)  2.544 (0.011)** 
ω1t  βw0 (0.005)  2.135(0.033)** 
ω it+1  Βw1 (-0.007)  -2.487 (0.013)** 
J- Statistic, (Instrumental rank)  21.87 (39)   
Sargan P value  0.643   
LM1/LM2  0.479/0.594   
Wald test (P value)  30.534 (0.000)   
Note: 84 firms and T= 9. The model is estimated in first differences to eliminate firm-specific 
effects: Arellano & Bond (1991). Instruments are dated t-2. J-Statistics is a general version of the 
Sargan test, a test of over-identifying restrictions. Sargan statistics follows a χ
(p-k) distribution, 
where k is the number of estimated coefficients and p is the instrument rank. LM1/LM2 is the 
Lagrange Multiplier test for first and second order serial correlation. Wald tested the restrictions. 
*** significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%.   
 
The model was tested for first and second order auto-correlation; probability values of the 
Lagrange Multiplier do not indicate a serial correlation problem. From the Eviews™ generated J-
Statistic, the probability value for the Sargan test was calculated
1.  Similarly, the probability 
value for the Sargan test (0.643) for over-identifying restrictions is clearly above the limit. 
Finally, the Wald statistics are for testing the join significance of the restrictions βy1= 0 & βw1= 0.  
The signals of the parameters predicted by the dynamic shirking version of the efficiency 
wage model are βy1> 0 & βw0, βw1 > 0. This suggests that the opportunity cost associated with a 
job loss due to future salary increase plays an important role during an employee’s calculations. 
Nonetheless, the estimated model has  βy1> 0 &  βw0  > 0, but  βw1  < 0, consistent with the 
bargaining model predictions as stated by Machin & Manning (1992, 298). The bargaining 
model implies continuing negotiation between employer and employee, considering that both are 
uncertain of each other’s optimal point. Theory suggests that the bargain model is more common 
among higher-paid workers (Strand, 2003); nevertheless, Pereau & Sanz (2006) suggests a 
positive interaction between the bargain and efficiency wage models.  
                                                             
1 For the relationship between J-Statistic and Sargan test, see Murray (2006). Despite the profound changes in the Brazilian economy after the mid-nineties—changes that 
brought inflation down from double figures monthly to a single one annually and opened up the 
economy to international competition—our estimated model does not support the hypothesis that 
large capitalization firms implemented a system of wages above market level to increase worker 
productivity, as suggested by the efficiency wage model. This is particularly appealing for our 
sample, which is composed of large firms with the explicit commitment of spontaneously 
disclosing their Annual Social Audits. The Annual Social Audits include several indicators 
regarding employee well-being, sometimes called corporate citizenship. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study decided to study the efficiency wage model, dynamic shirking version, based 
on two assumptions that would increase the feasibility of this model in the Brazilian economy. 
The first assumption took into account the drastic change in the overall economy’s performance 
after successful implementation of a stabilization plan.  After several years of economic turmoil, 
the Brazilian economy began experiencing price stability and increasing international 
competition. Would these new macroeconomic factors induce firms to pay wages above market 
level to increase labor productivity? The second assumption was that those firms willing to 
publicly adhere to the Annual Social Audit disclosures, including policies regarding so-called 
internal corporate citizenship—for instance, profit-sharing program, health benefits, and so on—
would have a higher likelihood of adopting the efficiency wage model. Our result suggests that 
the answers to these questions are negative.  
Our results fail to support the efficiency wage model, dynamic shirking version, but 
corroborate the bargaining model that implies successive negotiations between a firm and its 
employees. Due to the study’s limitations, its results should be assessed with caution. There are 
different wage theories, and within those theories, different ways of modeling them—for 
instance, Faria (2000, 2005) and Pereau & Sanz (2006). Splitting a large number of firms by 
sector might eventually be influential on the outcomes—as seen, for instance, in Arbach et al 
(2004) and Esteves (2006). In conclusion, while an ultimate accounting of the wage-setting 
remains to be seen, this study suggests that firms adopting the Annual Social Audit, at least on 
this dimension, are not paying wages above market level.   
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